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Taking the September 2014 disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Normal 
School in rural Guerrero State as its point of departure, this paper explores the 
interlinking experiences of government corruption, narco-trafficking, and elite privilege 
as they have played out through the larger social crisis that followed the disappearances. I 
argue that the fissures within Mexican responses to Ayotzinapa reveal a great deal about 
the ways that racial and class privilege continue to characterize civil-society movements 
in Mexico. Broad, civil-society coalitions to combat political corruption, impunity and 
violence have been difficult to sustain here, a problem that has been particularly striking 
given the spectacular nature of the recent waves of violence in Mexico. This paper argues 
that it is the entrenched nature of middle-class and elite dependence on class and racial 
privilege that ultimately makes those alliances unthinkable. 
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Politicians, Narcos, Missing Students, and Mexico’s Crisis  
 
The state is not the reality which stands behind the mask 
of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents 
our seeing political practice as it is.  
Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State”1 
 
 
On April 4, 2011, while grieving the death of his 24-year old son Juan Francisco, Javier 
Sicilia Ortega penned the following letter to Mexico’s politicians and narcos: 
The brutal assassination of my son, Juan Francisco, of Julio César Romero Jaime, of Luis 
Antonio Romero Jaime, and of Gabriel Anejo Escalera, is added to so many other boys 
and girls who have been assassinated just the same throughout the country, not only 
because of the war unleashed by the government of Calderón against organized crime, 
but also the rotting of the heart that has been wrought by the poorly labeled political class 
and the criminal class, which has broken its own codes of honor. 
I do not wish, in this letter, to speak with you about the virtues of my son, which were 
immense, nor of those of the other boys that I saw flourish at his side, studying, playing, 
loving, growing, to serve, like so many other boys, this country that you all have shamed. 
Speaking of that doesn’t serve for anything more than to move what already moves the 
heart of the citizenry to indignation. Neither do I wish to talk about the pain of my family 
and the families of each one of the boys who were destroyed. There are not words for this 
pain. Only poetry can come close to it, and you do not know about poetry. What I do 
wish to say to you today from these mutilated lives, from the pain that has not name 
because it is fruit of something that does not belong in nature – the death of a child is 
always unnatural and that’s why it has no name: I don’t know if it is orphan or widow, 
but it is simply and painfully nothing – from these, I repeat, mutilated lives, from this 
suffering, from the indignation that these deaths have provoked, it is simply that we have 
had it up to here. 
We have had it up to here with you, politicians – and when I say politicians I do not refer 
to any in particular, but, rather, a good part of you, including those who make up the 
political parties – because in your fight for power you have shamed the fabric of the 
nation. Because in middle of this badly proposed, badly made, badly led war, this war 
that has put the country in a state of emergency, you have been incapable – due to your 
cruelties, your fights, your miserable screaming, your struggle for power – of creating the 
consensus that the nation needs to find the unity without which this country will not be 
able to escape. We have had it up to here because the corruption of the judicial 
institutions generates the complicity with crime and the impunity to commit it, because in 
the middle of that corruption that demonstrates the failure of the state, each citizen of this 
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country has been reduced to what the philosopher Giorgio Agamben called, using a 
Greek word, “zoe”: an unprotected life, the life of an animal, of a being that can be 
violated, kidnapped, molested and assassinated with impunity. We have had it up to here 
because you only have imagination for violence, for weapons, for insults and, with that, a 
profound scorn for education, culture, and opportunities for honorable work, which is 
what good nations do. We have had it up to here because your short imagination is 
permitting that our kids, our children, are not only assassinated but, later, criminalized, 
made falsely guilty to satisfy that imagination. We have had it up to here because others 
of our children, due to the absence of a good government plan, do not have opportunities 
to educate themselves, to find dignified work, and spit out onto the sidelines become 
possible recruits for organized crime and violence. We have had it up to here because the 
citizenry has lost confidence in its governors, its police, its army, and is afraid and in 
pain. We have had it up to here because the only thing that matters to you, beyond an 
impotent power that only serves to administrate disgrace, is money, the fomentation of 
rivalry, of your damn “competition,” and of unmeasured consumption which are other 
names of the violence. 
As for you, the criminals, we have had it up to here with your violence, with your loss of 
honor, your cruelty and senselessness. 
In days of old you had codes of honor. You were not so cruel in your paybacks and you 
did not touch the citizens nor their families. Now you do not distinguish. Your violence 
already can’t be named because, like the pain and suffering that you provoke, it has no 
name nor sense. You have lost even the dignity to kill. You have become cowards like 
the miserable Nazi sonderkommandos who kill children, boys, girls, women, men and 
elders without any human sense. We have had it up to here because your violence has 
become infrahuman – not animal, as animals do not do what you do – but subhuman, 
demonic, imbecilic. We have had it up to here because in your taste for power and 
enrichment you humiliate our children and destroy them, producing fear and fright. 
It is you, “señores” politicians, and you, “señores” criminals – in quotes because this 
epithet is given only to honorable people – are with your omissions, your fights and your 
actions, making the nation vile. The death of my son Juan Francisco has lifted up 
solidarity and a cry of indignation – that my family and I appreciate from the depth of our 
hearts – from the citizenry, and from the media. That indignation comes back anew to put 
in our ears the phrase that Martí directed at those who govern: “If you can’t, then resign.” 
Putting this back in our ears – after the thousands of anonymous and not anonymous 
cadavers that we have at our backs, which is to say, of so many innocents assassinated 
and debased – this phrase must be accompanied by large citizen mobilizations that 
obligate you, at these moments of national emergency, to unite to create an agenda that 
unites the nation and believes in a state of real governability. The citizen networks of the 
state of Morelos are calling for a national march on Wednesday, April 6, that will leave at 
5 pm from the monument of the Dove of Peace to the Government Palace, demanding 
justice and peace. If the citizenry does not unite in this and constantly reproduce it in all 
cities, in all towns and regions of the country, if we are not capable of obligating you, 
“señores” politicians, to govern with justice and dignity, and you, “señores” criminals, to 
retake your codes of honor and limit your savagery, the spiral this violence has generated 
will bring us on a path of horror without return. If you, “señores” politicians do not 
govern well and do not take seriously that we live in a state of national emergency that 
requires your unity, and you, “señores” criminals, do not limit your actions, you will end 
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up winning and having power but you will govern and reign over a mountain of ossuaries 
and of beings that are beaten and destroyed in their souls, a dream that none of us envy. 
There is no life, Albert Camus wrote, without persuasion and without peace, and the 
history of Mexico today only knows intimidation, suffering, distrust and the fear that one 
day another son or daughter of another family will be debased and massacred. If you only 
knew what you are asking of us to accept - that death, as is already happening today, 
becomes an affair of statistics and administration and which we should all get used to. 
Because we do not want this, next Wednesday we will go out into the street: because we 
do not want one more child, one more son, assassinated, the citizen networks of Morelos 
are calling for national citizen unity that we must keep alive to break the fear and 
isolation that the incapacity of you, “señores” politicians, and the cruelty of you, 
“señores” criminals, want us to put in our bodies and souls. 
I remember, in this sense, some verses by Bertolt Brecht, when the horror of Nazism, 
which is to say the horror of the installation of crime in the daily life of a nation, 
appeared: “One day they came for the blacks, and I said nothing. Another day they came 
for the Jews, and I said nothing. One day they came for me (or for a son of mine) and I 
had nothing to say.” Today, after so many crimes supported, when the destroyed body of 
my son and his friends has brought the citizenry to mobilize anew, and in the media we 
must speak with our bodies, with our walk, with our cry of indignation, so that those 
verses of Brecht are not made a reality in our country. 
We must restore dignity to this nation.2 
 
Written in the midst of acute grief, the desire to restore is first and foremost a desire to 
restore his son to life. Understood in that light, one can easily see Sicilia’s choice of words. 
Something existed, was taken away, and must be restored. Given that his son cannot be returned, 
the nation stands in. 
A little more than three years later, hundreds of relatives of the 43 disappeared students 
from Normal School in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, also demanded a restoration, but theirs was more 
concrete. They wanted the return of their children (their signs read “Los Queremos Vivos”), and 
insisted that they were still alive. Theirs too was a futile demand, and might be read as 
expression of their grief, their inability to accept that what we all knew was true. Most likely 
however, they do know the truth about their children. Their words instead express the 
impossibility of the only thing that will make it right. These words also express something much 
deeper; the fact that there is nothing that this state can do in order to fix what it has broken; that 
the only thing it can do is disappear itself. Far from being a naïve or grief-stricken denial of facts, 
Los Queremos Vivos can in fact be read as a refusal to acknowledge the existence of the very 
thing that killed their children. If there was a state, this never would have happened. 
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We can see similarities between their and Sicilia’s grief, but something does not quite 
align. In his evocation of Agamben, Sicilia insists that Mexicans have been reduced to “bare 
life”. He insists that their rights of citizenship have effectively been revoked, that they have been 
expelled from society and become “homo sacer” (sacred man), subject to be killed by anyone 
because the law no longer applied to them.3 They have suffered the loss of personhood. And yet 
for the family members of the missing 43, it is not at all clear that they have lost personhood, so 
much as they never had it.  
The subtle dissonances between Sicilia’s words and the claims of the victims’ families lie 
at the very heart of our challenge to understand Mexico’s contemporary crisis. Liberals, 
intellectuals, middle-class Mexicans – those who more or less wound up on the winning side of 
globalization – shout “it was the state” as a means of pointing to a systematic failure, a state that 
has lost a legitimate claim on a monopoly of violence, that has failed to protect human rights, 
oddly echoing the now discredited paradigm of “state failure”4 in part because they want to will a 
certain kind of state (a state that would protect their rights) into existence. Sometimes they even 
insist that Mexico is on its way to becoming a nation of laws, institutions and transparent 
governance,5 and that this particular state, that of the well-coifed and undeniably criminal 
Enrique Peña Nieto, is simply an obstacle on that path. They likewise tend to bristle at those who 
extend the claim, who point out that something much larger that citizen safety and good 
government might be at stake; those who claim that the state that has provided them with 
comfortable lives did so through a system that relies on the super-exploitation of their poor, dark-
skinned compatriots. And they have no real answer to the claims made by the families of the 
missing 43. 
The Story of a Massacre 
First the unbelievable. On September 26, 2014, 43 students from the Escuela Normal 
Rural de Ayotzinapa, José Luis Hernández Rivera, said to be on their way to the annual 
commemoration of the Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico City (to be held October 2) disappeared 
shortly after commandeering a group of buses in the nearby town of Iguala (six other students 
were killed in the confrontation that lead to the kidnapping). The fact that they commandeered 
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the buses (some would say hijacked) was not unusual. They did this every year, and then every 
year returned the buses after their trip. That students from two of the commandeered buses 
disappeared without a trace was not normal. This region has a long history of violent politics, 
including several recent massacres, and only months earlier 31 people had gone missing in the 
nearby town of Cocula, but these disappearances were often attributed to some sort of guilt on 
the part of the disappeared. They were narcos, or working with the narcos. This did not seem to 
be the case for these students, who were poor, largely indigenous, and were attending one of the 
most radical teacher colleges in the country. They were likely revolutionaries, to be sure, but not 
narcos. 
Mexico was already in a heightened state of tension when the story broke. The country’s 
baby-faced president, Enrique Peña Nieto, had managed to sell a changed narrative of the 
country to the world (our drug war is receding, look at how we grow!), but young, urban 
Mexicans had been organizing around a variety of issues since before the election. He seemed 
like a fraud. There was a great deal of evidence that he had been the beneficiary of soft coverage 
from the country’s television networks and all sorts of illegal campaign spending. Just three 
months before Ayotzinapa, Mexican army soldiers killed 22 in the town of Tlatlaya, Mexico, 
covering up the incident by planting evidence that suggested a prolonged firefight. According to 
the popular website Animal Politico, at least two senior generals knew about the incident and 
participated in the cover-up.6 
There was a farcical quality to the news from Iguala following the September 26. Rumors 
circulating in town blamed María de los Ángeles Pineda, the wife of Jose Luis Abarca, the PRD 
(Mexico’s erstwhile left-wing party) mayor of Iguala, for the kidnappings. It was said that de los 
Ángeles, who had political aspirations of her own and had close ties to a local drug gang known 
as the Guerreros Unidos, had ordered the students eliminated because they had threatened to 
disrupt a speech she was scheduled to deliver. The mayor and his wife went missing on 
September 30 (they were ultimately arrested in Mexico City on November 4). Local informants 
then led investigators to a mass grave with 28 bodies on October 5, though it turned out that it 
did not contain the remains of the students. On October 14, four more mass graves discovered, 
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again with remains that did not match the students. In all, local informants led government 
investigators to nine mass graves, none of which contained the remains of the students. 
Given de los Ángeles’ close ties to the PRD governor of the state, Ángel Aguirre (she 
was rumored to be his lover, and at the very least was reported regularly to send him suitcases 
full of cash from the local traffickers), it was easy to imagine that this was not simply a local 
affair. Protestors in Chilpancingo, the state capital, set fire to government buildings on October 
13. On October 20 protestors set fire to a Government Social Assistance office, and on October 
21 teachers from the state set fire to PRD headquarters in Chilpancingo. By October 22 protests 
were taking place across the country, including one in Mexico City that drew upwards of 50,000 
demonstrators. Governor Aguirre resigned on October 23. Four days later police arrested four 
members of Guerreros Unidos, who in turn led them to a new mass grave in the town of Cocula. 
Early on the protests in Guerrero had a violent cast. It is possible that the crowds were 
infiltrated by agitators, but the video footage suggests that here and in some other parts of the 
country (Oaxaca in particular) the crowds that assembled in these early days had blood on their 
minds. Making matters worse, in these regions police and soldiers responded to demonstrations 
with brute force, repeatedly attacking demonstrators and stoking their rage. The fires and 
destruction seemed to speak to long-standing and deep hostilities between the rural, mostly poor 
(and admittedly radical) campesinos and teachers who gathered in the demonstrations, and state 
agencies with a long history of using violence and terror to maintain order. 
By contrast, the demonstrations that took place in Mexico City during these weeks were 
remarkable for their lack of violence. At first most of the demonstrators were university students, 
but as the weeks went by a loose arrangement of dissidents of all kinds – intellectuals, union 
leaders, parents with young children, school and university students – constituted a growing 
movement that seemed to threaten governability in the capital. Most seemed to be residents of 
Mexico City (the caravans of campesinos did not really start making their way to demonstrations 
in Mexico City until later in November), and echoed the language of Mexico’s Movement 
against Delinquency, which had been organizing on the margins of civil society for nearly 20 
years (a decade earlier they had organized one of the largest demonstrations in the history of the 
capital). Marchers spoke about their fatigue with violent crime, with the politicians who 
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themselves were often the authors of crime, with impunity and corruption. They spoke of 
creating a Mexico of laws, of rights, where citizens felt safe.  
Their numbers swelled dramatically on November 8, 2014, the day after a press 
conference in which Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam announced that the students had 
been cremated at the Cocula garbage dump and thrown in a river. An Argentine forensics team 
with special skills at identifying these types of remains was on their way to investigate the site. 
He announced 80 arrests, including 44 police. Ending the press conference without taking 
questions from the victims’ families in the audience, he announced “ya me canse” (I am tired/I 
have had enough). 
The November 7 press conference was made for social media. Rallying under the hashtag 
#yamecanse, somewhere between 60,000 and 120,000 students marched, performed street 
theatre, and loudly announced their fatigue with crime, lawlessness, bad government. They did 
so with remarkable civility, a self-conscious statement about government violence. Indeed, it 
would seem that in order to justify a certain amount of brutality, police sent agitators into the 
crowd, who in turn tried to set fire to the doors of the National Palace.7 The infiltrators were 
quickly exposed, and the police response only further fueled the rage – which at least in Mexico 
City still remained largely peaceful. Across various social media platforms a variety of 
participants not only claimed that they had acted peacefully, but posted images, videos, and 
testimonies that proved their claims.  
On November 12 protestors took over government tollbooths and set fire to the 
legislature buildings in Chilpancingo. Eight days later, on the anniversary of the beginning of the 
Mexican Revolution in 1910, there were protests in 26 Mexican states, and student walkouts in 
122 secondary schools and universities across the country. In the Federal District, three groups of 
students set off at 5 pm from three points in the city (the Monument of the Revolution, the 
Angel, and Tlatelolco), with a plan to converge of the Zócalo. A crowd that organizers claimed 
was 500,000 strong (the police claimed 30,000) included students, families, friends and families 
of the missing, activists from human rights organizations (including Amnesty International [AI]), 
and members from a variety of Catholic organizations (Misioneras de Nuestra Señora del 
Perpetuo Socorro and the Franciscanas de María Inmaculada). Though once again largely 
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peaceful, some protestors clashed with police after the end of the march, throwing Molotov 
cocktails and rocks. Two people were wounded, and 11 were arrested, charged with attempted 
murder, tortured, and sent to a variety of prisons. A judge threw out the charges several days 
later. 
Over the next few weeks the Peña Nieto administration made a number of efforts to 
contain the damage. On November 27 he introduced a series of security reforms, proposing that 
local police be replaced by state police in several regions. These proposals were roundly 
criticized for ignoring the allegations that state and federal police had been involved in the Iguala 
kidnappings. On December 6 Murillo Karam announced that the remains of one of the students 
(Alexander Mora Venancio) had been identified by a lab in Innsbruck, lending credibility to his 
earlier declaration that the students had been cremated in Cocula. 
Murrillo Karam’s account, which was now backed up by forensic science and 
confessions by several Guerreros Unidos members, focused on local corruption, a rogue mayor 
and his wife, rogue local police, and their ties to a cartel. The students had angered the mayor’s 
wife, been taken into custody by the local police, turned over to the Guerreros Unidos, and taken 
to the nearby garbage dump in Cocula. Those who did not die on the trip were executed, their 
bodies cremated and put into bags, and the remains dumped in a local river. The fact that the 
students had been detained just yards away from the army barracks of Battalion 27, notorious for 
its dirty campaigns in Guerrero, was said to be mere coincidence. In spite of witness testimony 
that they were at the scene, the federal police were absolved of any knowledge of the crime.  
Murillo Karam backed up this story by releasing elements of the testimony (obtained 
under torture) of Felipe Rodríguez Salgado, known as El Cepillo, who was one of the members 
of the Guerreros Unidos to have confessed to the crime at Ayotzinapa. He indicated that José 
Luis Hernández Rivera, the director of the school, had been paid by a rival criminal group called 
los Rojos to send the students into Iguala on September 26 in order to stir up trouble.8  
Few were convinced by this account. It was dismissed by AI, the Washington Office on 
Latin America (WOLA), the Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH), and 70 
Mexican civil-society groups. Families of the students disputed the Rojos connection, saying the 
students in the school were too politically radical to get involved with narcos. El Universal, 
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which is normally fairly conservative, published an editorial lamenting the shocking frequency 
with which official versions of these stories turn out to be a tissue of lies.9 Around the same time 
expert testimony reported in La Jornada and elsewhere raised significant questions as to whether 
the cremation story was even possible. Jorge Antonio Montemayor Aldrete, a professor at 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) who led a team investigating this theory, 
concluded that it would have taken 33 tons of wood or 995 tires to incinerate the bodies, and that 
the space of the dump, which was about 540 square meters, was simply insufficient for such an 
undertaking. He also concluded that it would have taken two tractor-trailer trucks to move the 
wood to the dump, which was extremely unlikely given the narrow and muddy path. If tires were 
used, the remaining steel belts would have been found in the dump. The fire would have had to 
reach 1,600 degrees Celsius, but there was no evidence of a fire of that intensity in the area. 
These theories were also brought into question by the fact that it had rained in Cocula on 
September 26 and 27. 
Only one bone fragment had been identified as belonging to one of the students, and it 
was much less charred than the rest of the remains sent to Innsbruck, which were too degraded to 
test for DNA. This raised the likelihood that the remains were produced in an army crematorium 
or incinerator in Iguala and then transported to the dump. On January 12, 2015 several family 
members, who claimed that the last GPS signals from their children’s cellphones came from 
inside the army base, tried to gain entry to the base. They were violently rebuffed. 
On January 24 the Guerrero newspaper El Sur reported that the Argentine forensic team 
had relayed their doubts about the Cocula dump theory to the families of the students. The team 
also indicated that the remains of Alexander Mora did not correspond with the rest of the 
remains, that they seemed to have been in a different physical state than the other remains from 
the dump, suggesting evidence tampering. Two days later there were 40 marches across the 
country demanding the return of the students.  
Murillo Karam responded by attacking the Argentine forensic scientists for making their 
doubts about Cocula public, claiming that they were sowing doubt without having all the 
evidence, and on January 27 he declared the case closed. A month later he resigned as attorney 
general. 
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Absurd 
Amidst his ham-fisted efforts to contain one scandal, Peña Nieto fell into another in 
November 2014. On November 9 the journalist Carmen Aristegui released a story indicating that 
the newly renovated house in which the president and his family lived (now known as the casa 
blanca) had been bought for them by a construction company with long-standing ties to the 
president.10 The company, the Grupo Higa, had earned hundreds of millions from contracts with 
Peña Nieto while he was governor of Mexico State, and had only recently won a $3.7 billion 
contract to build a light rail link between Mexico City and León, Guanajuato (the contract was 
cancelled in November 2014 when the scandal broke). It also turned out that in 2005 Peña Nieto 
had bought another house from the Grupo Higa while they were winning lucrative contracts from 
his state government. His finance minister at the time (and later finance minister in the federal 
government), Luis Videgaray, bought a house on a golf course for $500,000 with a mortgage 
from the Grupo Higa. First Lady Angélica Rivera only made matters worse when she improbably 
claimed that the $7-million house actually belonged to her (she claimed it was purchased with 
her earnings from her roles on telenovelas), releasing a dreadful YouTube video in which she 
insisted that the people of Mexico get out of her private business.11  
There is no credible evidence that she could have purchased this and other properties she 
owns (some in the US) out of her TV earnings. Nor is their any explanation how the president, 
who has lived his entire life as a public servant, amassed declared assets of over $3.3 million 
(US) during his career. Peña Nieto of course attacked Aristegui for reporting the story, claiming 
she was trying to capitalize on social unrest to make her name. He seems to have managed to 
have the two principle investigators working on the story fired by Aristegui’s employer (MVS 
Comunicaciones) in March 2015.  
Peña Nieto was not alone in facing unwanted scrutiny for his ill-gotten gains during the 
crisis. In the midst of this scandal, the PRD mayor of Mexico City and his council quietly 
declined to release information about their real estate holdings, for “security reasons”. Then 
Carlos Mateo Aguirre Rivero, the brother of the ousted governor of Guerrero, was arrested on 
charges that he had skimmed 20% from all state contracts (he was known as Mr. 20%) while his 
brother was governor. In February 2015, José Murat Casab, the former governor of Oaxaca and 
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father of the current head of the agency in charge of housing for workers, INFONAVIT, was 
profiled in the New York Times, accused of being connected to at least six properties in the US 
without having ever earned the kind of money that could account for how they were purchased.  
Other stories flooded the media during the fall of 2014 and winter of 2015. Mexicans 
learned that, as governor of Guerrero, Ángel Aquirre diverted at least 287 million pesos into 
contracts and accounts of his friends and family members, and that Carlos Hank Rhon, a key 
member of the Grupo Atlacomulco (the long-standing clique of Priistas which was instrumental 
in bringing Peña Nieto to power), is in first place among Mexico’s HSBC’s clients with Swiss 
accounts, his holdings amounting to $ 157 million (US). They learned that Roberto San Román 
Dunne, godfather to one of Peña Nieto’s children, has won contracts from the Federal 
government worth more than $40 million (US) since Peña Nieto became president.  
The fall also brought news that an old blast from the past, Raúl Salinas, was finally going 
to be able to keep his unexplained wealth. On December 12, 2014, a federal judge in Mexico 
cleared Raúl, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas, of all charges stemming from a 
series of spectacular crimes dating to the 1990s (among the charges were allegations of over 
$100 million in illicit enrichment). Salinas’ managed to get the ruling in spite of the 48 Swiss 
accounts that could be traced to him, phony companies in the Cayman Islands, millions in 
transfers between Mexico and the US that could be traced directly to Raul (at least $130 million), 
and incriminating conversations in jail in which it seemed that Carlos was the architect of the 
entire scheme. The judge in the case also released funds, bank accounts, and properties bought 
by Salinas using aliases and false passports. 
Mexico’s opposition parties remained silent in the face of these scandals, in part because 
their leaders are implicated in a great deal of wrongdoing. The mayor of Iguala and governor of 
Guerrero, after all, were both from the opposition PRD (though both used to be Priistas, and the 
governor in particular was close to the president). Mexico’s right-wing party, the PAN, is 
reputed to have been involved in epic levels of corruption under former president Felipe 
Calderón,12 and PAN governors in various parts of the country have been implicated in a string 
of recent human rights abuses. In other settings, PRD and PAN politicians have passed laws 
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intended to discourage public protests that arguably violate the human rights of Mexicans, and 
have repeatedly imprisoned their critics.13 
Records obtained by Reuters through Mexico’s transparency laws suggest that in recent 
years members of all parties have been looting the national oil company, PEMEX, at an alarming 
rate. The news agency’s 2014 investigation found a recent report by Mexico’s Federal Audit 
Office that flagged over 100 questionable PEMEX contracts, amounting to $11.7 billion (US).14 
They also found that in the 160 internal investigations concerning wrongdoing conducted within 
PEMEX in recent years, contractors were never penalized, and that in only three cases were 
employees punished, with suspensions ranging from five days to six months. The same 
investigation found that from 2007 to 2013, 40 companies won $88.1 million in contracts in spite 
of being banned by the company from receiving contracts. Among the beneficiaries was an 
alleged associate of Mexico’s most notorious drug gang, the Zetas. The Ministry of Public 
Administration (SFP), which was charged with examining the improper use of government 
resources, and was in charge of investigating PEMEX, missed the fact that a contractor 
associated with the Zetas (Francisco “Pancho” Colorado) received $35 million in contracts from 
the company even though he was banned from working with the company. Other contracts 
included $9 million to tow a rig halfway around the world when the rig was already in the Gulf 
of Mexico. 
Between 2008 and 2012 PEMEX was issued 274 recommendations to fix irregularities, 
but took no action in all but three cases, where it suspended a handful of employees. Moreover, 
The SFP almost never pursued cases against company and government officials. Their salaries 
are paid by PEMEX and they work in PEMEX offices. 
How ironic then, that one of Peña Neito’s election promises was to tackle corruption. 
Actually, not ironic, cynical. When in office he immediately took to dismantling the institutions 
that might undermine his efforts to control the good-news narrative of a Mexico that was 
prosperous, stable, and past the drug wars. One of his first targets in this regard was the SFP, 
founded by President Fox in 2003 to foment the development of a professional and honest public 
administration. Neither Fox nor Calderón ever did much to actualize or support SFP, and 
Calderón first proposed eliminating the SFP in 2009. It was significantly weakened in 2012 
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when the Pact for Mexico between the leading political parties undermined the power of 
congress to actually investigate the executive branch. 
Peña Nieto proposed eliminating the SFP in 2013 – moving most of its functions into the 
finance ministry, run by his friend Luis Videgaray (who was also instrumental in funneling 
questionable money into his election campaign). It was to be replaced by a Comisión Nacional 
Anticorrupción (CNA), run by a committee of the same notables it might be expected to 
investigate. The PAN and PRD both agreed to the proposal, merely insisting that the SFP not be 
fully disbanded until the CNA was set up. However, stripped of most of its power, the zombie 
SFP could do little to investigate public corruption. Meanwhile, no one took any action to create 
the CNA. 
At this writing the SFP is in legal limbo, and incapable of investigating the allegations 
surrounding Peña Nieto and his clique. This is one reason why he named Virgilio Andrade, a PRI 
hack, to investigate allegations of corruption in early 2015. Naturally, the casa blanca case was 
excluded from his mandate. According to John Ackerman, he is “la persona perfecta para 
encabezar este Frankenstein en fase terminal. Su única función será tapar, cubrir y limpiar los 
evidentes conflictos de interés y corruptelas de su jefe y sus amigos en el gabinete 
presidencial.”15 
In which We Scratch Our Heads 
The scale of depravity that seems to characterize Mexico’s political classes at the 
moment puts us at risk of sweeping generalities. Mexico is corrupt, impossibly so. Mexico has 
always been this way. Mexico is a backwards place, having never found a way to embrace the 
principles that govern liberal democracies. And yet these types of sweeping statements, made by 
both Mexicans and foreigners, place us at risk of both orientalizing Mexico and failing to 
understand both change and the resilience of old practices over time. 
Claudio Lomnitz warns us against seeing these phenomena as permanent or static, and 
looks instead for a specific moment when the kind of state Mexico has today was created. He 
roots it in the nineteenth-century civil strife that gripped the country after independence, which 
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in turn resulted in decades of economic stagnation that in turn produced a state that was 
particularly vulnerable to corruption.16 The results of these phenomena, he argues, are a 
historically vast informal economy, vast amounts of petty corruption, and a tax base that is 
extremely small (the Mexican state relies very heavily on revenues from Pemex to fund itself – 
this accounts to up to 30% of the federal budget). Lomnitz also holds US drug and gun control 
policies accountable for much of the current chaos, which preys on Mexico’s weak and corrupt 
system of law enforcement. 
Parsed a certain way, Lomnitz’ critique suggests a desire to create a stronger state, one 
that is not only better able to tax its citizens fairly and effectively, but also better able to 
guarantee human rights, the rule of law, and clean government. His project, like that of most 
human rights organizations and many of the journalists and intellectuals quoted above, is to 
create a country of laws and strong institutions where none historically existed. Many of these 
intellectuals believe that Mexico might have been on a halting path towards this goal – the 
country elected an opposition party in 2000 and enacted laws to ensure fair elections and 
improve public administration, it had been growing economically for some time, and had seen 
the emergence of a robust civil society and press – only to have this journey derailed due to a 
spike in the illegal drug trade and a ham-fisted response by President Calderón that allowed a 
certain kind of devil to be resurrected in the form of Peña Nieto.  
The measures these critics typically use to judge the state rely on concepts like 
corruption, transparency, rule of law, and respect for human rights. These in turn are firmly 
rooted in a series of universalizing concepts – the most critical being the assumption that the 
sovereignty enjoyed by the state is the product of its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. This is the 
state that the liberal (forgive me, I use “liberal” liberally in this paper) modernizers aspire to 
create. It is a sovereignty that the state enjoys because it maintains the illusion that it enjoys a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force because it represents the people, was produced through 
the democratic process, and for the most part all citizens are equal before the law. Generation 
upon generation of Mexicans - from Hidalgo, Mora, and Juárez in the nineteenth century to 
Madero and Carranza in the twentieth century, to a host of current liberals like Sergio Aguayo, 
Denise Dresser, Irma Eréndira and John Ackerman, have aspired to that kind of state. And yet 
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generation after generation other logics have persisted. Mostly liberals describe these problems 
as the residue of a past not yet dispatched, or of people trapped in medieval mindsets, yet it is 
possible that something else needs to be explained. 
To be clear, most human rights advocates in Mexico insist that the implementation of a 
human rights regime is impossible without active steps also to address the social rights of the 
poor, and inequality in particular. They call for autonomous institutions, governed by national 
and international norms, committed to defending the rights of all Mexican citizens. The question 
is then, why has it been so hard, for so long, to implement such a regime? Mexicans have for the 
better part of two centuries been in a recurrent struggle to implement practices and institutions 
that would guarantee the rights of citizens, and yet these efforts have time and again failed to 
produce a state that resembles a liberal democracy. This is not a story of stasis, of a country that 
does not change and is therefore locked in some pre-modern fog. Mexico has gone through 
profound changes over the centuries, becoming an urban, cosmopolitan, industrialized society, 
with some of the most robust cultural, civic, and educational institutions in the Americas. The 
country has also seen repeated renovations of its social and political system, reforms that have 
improved the living conditions (as measured through the Human Development Index) of millions 
of people, the development of upwardly mobile working and middle classes, and seen 
democratic openings in a political system long characterized by authoritarian rule. The Mexico 
of the early twenty-first century is in many ways unrecognizable when compared to the Mexico 
of the early twentieth century, except inasmuch as the routine violation of human rights, political 
corruption, and high levels of everyday political violence seem to point back to a past that 
continues to impact on the present. That, and the fact that today, like in the early twentieth 
century, Mexico is one of the most unequal societies in the world. 
Mexico’s middle sectors have been particular beneficiaries of many of the changes the 
country experienced during the twentieth century. Beginning the century as relatively small and 
politically marginal, the middle class grew in size and stature congruent with the growth of the 
Mexican state, especially after the 1910 Revolution. To be middle class in much of twentieth-
century Mexico was to enjoy a certain set of expectations for life. One could expect a 
comfortable living, often connected to some form of public employment (or employment in a 
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firm that was protected by the state). It meant the capacity to hire household servants, nannies, 
cooks, cleaners, who made life relatively comfortable. It meant living in a relatively safe urban 
enclave where one could expect that certain publicly controlled utilities (water, gas, electricity, 
perhaps the telephone) were delivered with regularity. And it meant the capacity to feel relatively 
secure, not because one trusted the state or saw its institutions as legitimate, but because of the 
connections that a middle-class life guaranteed. Connections got you into the right schools. 
Connections helped you get out of trouble with the police if there was trouble. Connections got 
your child a job. In the latter part of the century connections helped you buy a condo in Houston 
or a house on South Padre Island, the sorts of hedges you might need should the peso collapse or 
the economy go south. These connections operated through a complex set of arrangements with 
the state. At moments (say, when there was trouble with the police) they protected you from the 
state. At others (when you needed a favor from a bureaucrat) they came in the form of the state. 
One’s personal sense of security was rooted in the network, the neighborhood, the sense that if 
the police did anything, they targeted dangerous elements for violence. Personal security on the 
other hand, came in the form of high walls topped with broken glass, loud dogs, and the relative 
safety of crowded public spaces.  
During most of the twentieth century, middle-class Mexicans (even most working-class 
Mexicans) did not equate security with the abstraction we know as human rights. These were not 
universal rights, but privileges secured through a series of distinctions – through income, 
connection, skin color, the capacity to live in a better neighborhood, and membership in a union 
or other professional organization, all of which became ways that individuals connected 
themselves to power. The state in that sense was a series of personal connections that protected 
those who could envelop themselves in those ties, and not a series of abstract values that applied 
to all Mexicans. Indeed, the very notion of a state that treated everyone equally was anathema to 
those who could work these connections. Remarkably, the architecture of the state was 
sufficiently vast that a large percentage of those who lived in the cities – even those who worked 
in mines, in the oil industry, and occupied strategic positions across the country – felt the power 
of that connection through their formal and informal ties to power. When, in the early 1980s 
Sergio Aguayo travelled among workers in northern Mexico trying to spread the gospel of 
human rights, the obstacles he confronted did not just come from bosses and politicians, but from 
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those who found such an abstraction a futile gesture in a society where power and security rested 
in one’s capacity to work within the system, and where standing outside the system in the 
manner that human rights discourses advertised seemed like a foolhardy exercise. 
And yet it was not just this – the strategic calculation that one makes in order to find 
security in clientelism. The further one moves up the ladder of privilege, the more that 
distinction itself confers deeply appealing forms of power based on inequality. Even working-
class Mexicans enjoyed privileges under the system, whether it was better housing, jobs and 
access to medical care than their poorer counterparts, or the ubiquitous and generally low-paid 
servants who grace even lower-middle class homes. They could count on these forms of labor in 
part because government policies kept food prices low enough that Mexican peasants found it 
extremely difficult to make ends meet – resulting in a steady migration of hungry, rural folk into 
an urban labor market that never had enough jobs to go around. 
Do You Know Who I Am? 
Middle-class and wealthy Mexicans do feel a strong sense of obligation towards their 
servants – to take their children to the doctor, bail them out of jail when they are in trouble, lend 
them money in family emergencies – but in return they expect forms of deference that naturalize 
the hierarchy between the employer and employee. They expect a performance that privileges the 
patronage and benevolence of the social better and that elides the transactional nature of this 
relationship. 
In generations past one could catch the assumptions that undergirded this dynamic in 
occasional utterances in public – the young privileged male who was offended when a stranger 
used the informal tu, or the sense of awe that indigenous peasants expressed when President 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) treated them as equals. Lately however, social media offers us a 
never-ending flood of instances in which the rich and the political classes reveal the contours of 
their expectations of privilege. There are the incidents that seem obviously egregious, as when in 
April 2013 Andrea Benítez, the daughter of a the federal Attorney General for Consumer 
Protection, Humberto Benítez Treviño, had health inspectors close one of the most popular 
restaurants in Mexico City, the Maximo Bistro on Roma Norte, because she could not get a table. 
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Of course, the closure caused a public outrage, and the restaurant was quickly re-opened. Diners 
in the restaurant actually took photos of the inspectors closing the restaurant and posted them on 
social media. 
Elected officials have also repeatedly been embarrassed by the tweets of family members 
(Peña Nieto’s daughter famously called his critics “proles” on twitter), Facebook photos of their 
children vacationing in Europe and showing fancy wares (this includes the children of the mayor 
of Ecatepec, a poor community in the misery belt around Mexico City, the children of the mayor 
of Acapulco, and the daughter of the head of the PEMEX workers union17), and their generally 
tone-deaf utterances.18 But there are also the more quotidian moments suddenly caught on tape. 
Well known are the “Ladies of Polanco,” who in 2011 were pulled over for swerving in and out 
of their lane. The two drunken women refused to take blood alcohol tests, slapped the officers, 
shouted profanities, and called them “wage earners”. In 2012 a wealthy business owner in Lomas 
assaulted a doorman who refused to leave his post to help him change a tire. Only recently the 
governor of Chiapas (and future presidential hopeful) Manuel Velasco was filmed slapping an 
aid at a public event. Velasco’s face is plastered on billboards throughout the state, showing him 
hugging poor indigenous people. 
“Indio” is a common slur in Mexico, aimed at poor people by wealthy, light-skinned 
Mexicans. Though newly caught on tape, there is nothing new to these acts, which in turn speak 
to a society in which poor, dark skinned Mexicans are expected to serve middle-class and elite 
Mexicans with deference, and do so for very little money. And to be sure, the expected deference 
of the poor extends to the homes of the liberal and left-wing activists, politicians, and academics, 
whose lives also depend on the labor and deference of their servants. Not to put too fine a point 
on it, but middle-class Mexico is unimaginable without these distinctions.  
This is where the current wave of exposures that badly behaving elites have suffered in 
some ways masks the more insidious practices that they in fact reflect. Each exposure on social 
media is a moment in which privileged Mexicans abused those privileges, revealing their 
assumptions and perhaps naiveté about the need for new forms of discretion in the age of social 
media. They whet our appetite for scandal, for a privileged person to hate. And they suggest that 
the abuse that they have committed lies in a failure of comportment, discretion, politeness, a 
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desire to abuse their privilege. At the same time, they direct our attention away from the 
structural inequalities that this system produces, again focusing our attention on bad actors, 
abusers who need to be exposed, instead of a system for which they are only the singing canary. 
They are only the most spectacular examples of a system of structural inequality upon which not 
just Mexico’s elites, but the entire political and middle classes depend. 
Inasmuch as one of the defining characteristics of twentieth-century politics in the 
industrial West was a period in which middle-class households shed their servants (labor had 
become too costly, and the mechanization of certain forms of labor changed the nature of work 
in the household), the political parties that flourished during that era drew upon a middle class 
that was wage-dependent and not conscious of the ways in which its well-being depended on the 
super-exploitation of others. Middle-class Americans, Brits, Germans, and Frenchmen could 
imagine that they shared critical interests with the unionists who worked in their factories, and 
the miners, truckers and other workers who, like them, were wage earners. In Mexico however, 
that middle class, even when devastated by economic calamities, invariably depended on a 
system that regularized and enforced the dependence and deference of their servants. The very 
notion of accepting those servants as social equals was anathema, not only because it would 
mean raising their wages, but because it would mean altering the core forms of privilege that 
characterized their homes. And while it was true that industrial growth in urban centers, 
especially between the 1940s and 1980s, did produce a significant working class and reductions 
in inequality overall in Mexico, the growing urban working class did not represent a strain on the 
capacity of middle-class Mexicans to maintain armies of servants. Industrial growth was 
accompanied by considerable immiseration in the countryside (declining food prices, shifts in 
land from small-holders to large ones), and urban Mexicans never felt a want for a steady supply 
of brown-skinned uneducated servants. Industrial and other unionized jobs generally went to 
people who were either urban in origin or who had acquired the cultural capital associated with 
urban sensibilities, meaning that the most impoverished rural migrants to the cities generally had 
few options beyond low-paid work in the service or informal economy.  
Globalization promised to break these patterns, articulating local regions to national and 
international markets, and addressing persistent poverty through significant economic growth. In 
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some senses, it did deliver. World Bank figures indicate that Mexican GDP in 2014 was $1.178 
trillion, making Mexico the fourteenth-largest economy in the world. GDP per capita is at 
$9,750, just below the world average. Globalization has brought a boom in manufacturing 
exports, even if in recent years the overall growth rate has been a disappointing 2.4%, and at 
least during the first decade of the twenty-first century inequality seemed to be narrowing in 
Mexico. The percentage of Mexicans living in poverty ticked down for much of the 2000s, 
falling to 43% by 2006, before rising again to 52.3% by 2012. Inequality, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient, fell from 0.58 in 1968 to 0.47 in 2010.19  
That said, even as the Gini coefficient improved in the early years of the twenty-first 
century, the distribution was extraordinarily uneven, and mostly due to the effects of improved 
earnings among middle-class Mexicans and unionized workers (especially in the automobile 
sector), along with the measurable effects on health, education, and housing produced by social 
programs targeted to the very poor. The changes in inequality have also been highly localized 
during the past two decades, with some regions experiencing significantly greater decreases in 
inequality than the national average, while nearly 20% of Mexicans have seen inequality 
increase. Most of the violence of the drug war has been in the 10% of municipalities 
(representing nearly 20% of the population) where inequality has actually increased.20 
Measures for economic growth in Mexico since the 1980s suggest that the overall 
performance of the economy since that time has been much less robust than it was in the post-
war period, especially compared to the US. The gap in GDP per capita compared with the US is 
greater today than in 1980. The country has one of the lowest minimum salaries in Latin 
America, ranging from 66.45 to 70.1 pesos per day, and recent figures suggest that 4.4 million 
workers earn between 1 and 3 minimum wages, whereas another two million earn 3–5 minimum 
wages. The number of people earning 1–2 minimum wages grew 3% between 2007 and 2013, 
while those earning 3–5 shrank 23% during that time. Furthermore, with inflation the real value 
of these wages has been declining for some time. Even the Mexican government (which low-
balls these figures) estimates that an average Mexicans needs $13 (i.e., two minimum wages) per 
day to cover a basic diet.  
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Mexico is one of the most unequal countries among the large economies, better only than 
South Africa and Brazil. According to a 2014 report by the Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de 
la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), 53.3 million Mexicans live in poverty and 20 
million cannot meet their basic needs. This number represents more than 50% of Mexicans 
(across the region about 28% of people live in poverty21). Those in the top 10% earn 27 times as 
much as those in the bottom 10%. In OCED countries the difference tends to be 10 times as 
much. A 2013 study by the Hay Group found that the base salary of executives in Mexico City 
averaged $10,000 a month, $417 less than a comparable executive in New York City, whereas 
the minimum wage in New York was $7.25 per hour, compared to $5.05 per day in Mexico City. 
The typical Mexican CEO earns 121 times the minimum wage, which is the largest gap in Latin 
America. More troubling, these figures do not even capture the 29 million Mexicans (out of an 
economically active population of 52 million) who work in the informal sector.  
Productivity in Mexico has soared since the 1980s, but wages overall have stagnated. 
Wages and salaries as a portion of GDP has fallen from 40% to 18.9% since the 1980s, and the 
value of the minimum wage has fallen by 80%.22 Basically, mean income in Mexico in 2010 in 
constant dollars was lower than it was in 1990. Furthermore, a recent report by the Centro de 
Estudios Espinosa Yglesias in Mexico City found that while there was considerable social 
mobility within the middle class, the poorest Mexicans experience remarkably little social 
mobility. Another 2013 World Bank report found that Mexico had some of the worst rates of 
upward social mobility in Latin America.23  
Unlike in the OCED countries, tax revenues do little to ameliorate the differences in 
income. In most OECD countries income redistribution using tax revenues halve the Gini 
coefficient, but in Mexico tax policy has little impact on income distribution. Most of the benefit 
the poor receive is through social spending and conditional cash transfers. Systems of taxation 
that narrowly serve the interests of elites are commonplace in Latin America, but even worse in 
Mexico than elsewhere. Mexico’s tax burden constitutes just 12% of GDP, which again is among 
the lowest in Latin America.24 Taxes represent 26% of GDP in the US, and 32% in Brazil. 
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The Specter of Race  
There is a profoundly racial cast to these phenomena. Mexico is stratified according to 
skin color in terms of income, education, and social standing, with domestic workers, manual 
laborers, drivers, security guards, and the vast army of underpaid workers who keep the middle 
and upper classes afloat being drawn from dark-skinned people.25 Those residing in indigenous 
communities live in the most abject poverty, followed by rural migrants to the cities, especially 
the poorest among them, who betray their origins in indigenous communities through their poor 
Spanish and dress, and once in the cities rarely gain opportunities to rise above the lowest steps 
on the social ladder. Forced into marginal jobs in the service sector, as street performers, sellers 
of chiclets and cigarettes, or beggars, their persistent poverty serves as an explanation for their 
poverty. They are poor because they are Indian, their Spanish rudimentary because they are too 
simple. They deserve their lot in life. 
These forms of discrimination have a long history in Mexico, dating to a colonial period 
in which the caste system (the precursor to nineteenth-century scientific racism) determined that 
indigenous peoples would be the laborers of the colony. Though posited as a system intended to 
protect a Republic of Indians from voracious Spaniards, the caste system effectively functioned 
as a guarantor of agricultural and public labor in the colonies, feeding urban populations and 
building their roads. Generations later, much has changed and stayed the same. Rural, dark 
skinned Mexicans now constitute a central part of both the Mexican and the US stoop-labor force 
in agriculture, and in urban settings provide almost all of the labor that maintains the houses of 
the middle class and the rich.  
Over time some Mexicans have endeavored to change this. Educators, anthropologists, 
and other activists (the indigenistas) working for a series of government agencies spent decades 
attempting to improve the lot of indigenous Mexicans during the twentieth century, and even 
Carlos Salinas posited his neoliberal policies as something that would ultimately benefit 
indigenous peoples. They may have shared little ideologically, but what these actors on the left 
and right did share was a commitment to acting on an inert indigenous population, a general 
belief that without the interventions of the state indigenous Mexicans could not help themselves. 
Moreover, those on both the left and the right have long understood that as they were currently 
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constituted, indigenous politics mostly represented an unwelcome threat to the political order. 
Indigenous peoples might be educated to be proper citizens, or liberated to be small producers, 
but in their current state they were most likely to smash the state as either backward savages or 
primitive revolutionaries.  
For all their romance with figures like Emiliano Zapata, urban Mexicans have historically 
favored policies that promised to limit and control the potential of indigenous politics instead of 
ones that might unleash the political will of millions of marginalized people. This then became 
one of the core assumptions that characterized official politics in post-revolutionary Mexico. 
Indian Mexico, identified as such by its poverty, rural roots, and skin color, had to be controlled 
and contained. The economic value of this assumption is obvious inasmuch as these assumptions 
undergirded practices that normalized the super-exploitation of indigenous laborers in both urban 
and rural settings, but the visceral quality of the assumption is probably more important. 
Indigeneity represents a threat to survival, to be eliminated (through extermination or 
assimilation) or controlled. To have a voice, to have rights, is to be, for all intents and purposes, 
non-indigenous, because the inclusion of indigenous peoples in those rights before they were 
properly elevated could cause the system to collapse under the weight of their backwardness.  
Mexico’s most recent wave of globalizing reformers followed the same script, 
understanding that the rural, dark-skinned poor were to be acted on and not with. Those who 
prospered as the country integrated into the global system told themselves that the benefits would 
eventually reach these people, but that in the meantime they mostly needed to be controlled, for 
the country’s own good. If Mexico was to be a winner in the global game, these people were 
simply the cannon fodder, sacrificed for the good of the country.  
In turn, this system of physical control and marginalization has long nurtured a series of 
internal logics within indigenous communities. First and foremost is the sense among poor, 
marginalized Mexicans that state power is not something internal to their communities (not, at 
least in the Foucauldian sense). They do not willingly reproduce power through the myriad 
practices that urban Mexicans embrace in order to get through their days. State power is instead 
something external, something imposed on them, often through force, and generally understood 
as acting as a proxy for a narrow set of external interests (sometimes agents of the state 
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themselves, but at others large landowners, mining companies, timber companies, and the like). 
Even those agents who represent the supposedly more benevolent and softer forms of state power 
– institutions like the ministries of health, education, and the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI) 
often treat residents of indigenous communities with disdain, as if they were children, and their 
institutions wind up with reputations within indigenous communities for graft and abuse. These 
agents of the state are sometimes obeyed, sometimes negotiated with, and sometimes kicked out, 
but they invariably represent something that originates from the outside. And that state is often 
violent.26 During Mexico’s long period of PRI domination, the aura of peace was essential to 
self-fashioning, but rarely stood up to much scrutiny. Marginalized people did contest the 
authority of the state, and did sometimes manage to win concessions, but they also often found 
themselves imprisoned, tortured, or dead as a result of their efforts.27 
The state sometimes offered a Faustian bargain to rural Mexicans, trading limited 
opportunities in return for political quiescence. Poor students like those at Ayotzinapa could 
hope to ascend in a federal bureaucracy in order to improve their individual lot, and federal 
programs did sometimes improve the health, standard of living, and education levels of poor 
people, but these programs had the quality of arbitrary impositions from above, and for the most 
part benefited their well-to-do employees and local power brokers far more than they did the 
poor. Those who did not take the deal found that all variety of threats followed them around, 
from local political bosses and their henchmen (both police and private), to state and federal 
police, and at worst, the Mexican army. Guerrero especially had a long history of significant use 
of political violence by local elites in order to maintain their hold on power.  
Poor people have captured the state in carnivalesque moments, but these were fleeting 
experiences. Even the great transformations of the twentieth century were mostly planned from 
above, meant to impose transformations on the countryside, and locally contested inasmuch as 
the specific implementation of new property regimes was dependent on a variety of forms of 
local complaisance and varied over time and space. Moreover, the nature of the power that 
emerged out of the Revolution ensured that control over property would gradually return to the 
elites. Instead of creating a system that could represent the interests of poor people as a 
collectivity, the state created by the PRI sought popular participation in the service of certain 
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elite projects. The system often renovated itself, and did respond to popular unrest at various 
points, but those responses to popular unrest never construed popular demands to be for power, 
transparency, rights, governance – those issues traditionally defined as the liberal agenda. They 
instead focused on specific concessions on material issues, meant to construe popular demands 
as linked to subsistence and material well-being rather than around the sorts of universal values 
that inform a liberal idea of citizenship. Again, the fact that Mexican liberals repeatedly insisted 
on the need for universal citizenship masked the fact that the fundamental logics of governance 
were rooted in the assumption that the state should act on an “other” – variously defined as rural, 
campesino, illiterate, alcoholic, uneducated, and indigenous – sometimes helping that other, 
improving their lives, at other times controlling them through repression or concession. Never 
was the state and the other linked through the sorts of fraternal bonds that underlie liberal 
assumptions about the universality of law, the sovereignty of the people, or the concept of the 
state as an impartial arbiter. These ideas do have purchase in Mexico, just not very much. And 
liberal efforts to extend their reach have sometimes been undermined by the very assumptions 
that educated and urbane liberals make about their own distinctiveness from the multitudes. No 
right-thinking liberal would subject himself to the same law that governs the lives of their poor, 
rural, indigenous neighbors. 
This sentiment provides a remarkably powerful cover for rent-seeking behavior. Poor 
Mexicans expect government officials in their midst to steal public funds, abuse their charges, 
and get away with it. They feel entirely powerless to do anything other than occasionally drive 
the most abusive officials out, and must invariably calculate as to whether the meager benefits 
gained by allowing a government official into their village are worth the accompanying 
headaches. And this pattern is repeated on a regional and federal level. Some people do go into 
government with a desire to make their country better, to serve an abstraction they call Mexico. 
Most, however, seem to enter government service as rent seekers, individuals looking for 
opportunities of personal enrichment that come from control over the distribution of government 
largesse through social programs, contracts, and slush funds. 
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Corrupt 
Sometimes this is called corruption, and while this term of art may make sense in 
countries where corruption is a deviant practice (the assumption that most officials act in 
accordance with the law, and those who do not can be ferreted out and punished), the term does 
not quite ring true when the use of public office for personal gain is normative. Probably not 
every Mexican politician does this, and the country has a long history of those outside of the 
system seeking to expose illicit or unexplained enrichment (there are laws forbidding this, after 
all), and yet the tradition of using one’s office for personal gain and suffering no ill 
consequences for doing so is so powerful as to be a defining feature of Mexico’s political 
landscape.  
Since the 1970s Mexicans have been treated to story after story of government officials 
who enriched themselves inexplicably. Arturo Durazo was the Mexico City police chief who had 
a replica of Studio 54 in his house. President José López Portillo built himself a mansion in 
Acapulco. Miguel de la Madrid was said to have pocketed hundreds of millions of dollars, but 
perhaps even less than the monies appropriated by Carlos Salinas and his brother Raúl, who rode 
the twin waves of privatization and a surging illicit narcotics trade to vast wealth. Many of these 
stories were exposed in the magazine Proceso under the editorship of Julio Scherer García, and 
though Proceso was revolutionary for its time, revealing these excesses when no other 
magazines would, this did not mean that Mexicans were generally unaware of the malfeasance of 
their political elites. The Death of Artemio Cruz (1967), Carlos Fuentes’ epic novel of the 
Revolution, was mainly about the way that insiders enriched themselves after consolidating 
power. Octavio Paz and Samuel Ramos made the dishonesty of Mexicans in public life central to 
their narratives of Mexicanidad. Even José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, author of Mexico’s 
first novel in the second decade of the nineteenth century, lamented the depth of public 
corruption in Mexico – corruption that extended to all of the institutions that governed Mexican 
society, including the church.28 Peña Nieto himself comes from a political dynasty in 
Atlacomulco founded by Carlos Hank González, who was famous for the aphorism “a politician 
who is poor is a poor politician.” 
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Mexicans tolerated rent seeking on the part of their politicians as long as it did not disrupt 
middle-class privilege and did not cause immense disorder. Indeed, the types of order that 
characterized post-revolutionary society were in part produced through the very rent-seeking 
activities that politicians used to pad their wallets. It involved funding the patronage networks, 
allowing a variety of actors to secure special benefits through their membership in a union or a 
camara. It involved the perpetual negotiation of order through the maintenance of access to 
power for some, and through the willingness of some of the beneficiaries to enforce local order 
(especially in poor, restive, rural regions) in return for federal largesse. One could traer gente 
(literally, carry people) through patronage, or maintain peace by eliminating one’s enemies. The 
federal state was largely indifferent to the methods employed by local caciques, and to be sure, 
local power brokers usually deployed both strategies, but the order this system guaranteed 
allowed urban Mexico and those parts of the country that were linked to economic growth to 
prosper, while those that did not remained, on some level, invisible. This was also the type of 
system in which small-scale drug trafficking could flourish. 
Small-scale traffickers have been moving opium poppies and marijuana from farms in 
Mexico’s north (mainly Sinaloa) since at least the 1920s, when they began to build cooperative 
relationships with local police and government officials that allowed them to undertake their 
work relatively unmolested. Even into the 1970s, when the US government would periodically 
put pressure on the Mexican government to stem the flow of drugs northward, the traffickers 
would work with those officials to serve up a few scapegoats who ensured that their businesses 
remained robust. Raul Salinas Lozano, father of the Carlos, was well known as a partner in the 
trade. 
The bargain at the local level that characterized Mexico during much of the twentieth 
century is one in which local politicians participated with traffickers in what Gustavo Duncan 
calls “oligopolies of coercion”. In regions where the drug trade was a part of the local economy, 
the resources provided by traffickers subsidized local bossism – the traffickers offered access to 
consumer goods that in turn helped keep the peace. Various state agencies, including the police 
and the army, enforced rights of specific traffickers to their corridors (plazas).29 Drug trafficking 
was particularly attractive for its capacity to fund consumption in very poor areas, but also for its 
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ability to supplement the salaries of low-level state functionaries. In turn, these local oligopolies 
were loosely connected to shifting national oligopolies engaged in the same practices. A history 
replete with  drug cars being implicated, army units participating, Mexican governors taking 
bribes, and of the notorious likes of Raul Salinas (jr. and sr.), reminds us that the multilayered 
nature of participation in these illicit activities make it almost impossible to go after the narcos 
without going after the entire state. These efforts are made even more difficult by the fact that 
even those who appear to have few ties to the traffickers are often implicated in influence 
peddling schemes. Thus the disincentives for strengthening the institutions that might combat a 
variety of forms of malfeasance are simply too strong.  
Up through the 1980s, trafficking was a relatively small-scale operation, tightly 
controlled by Félix Gallardo through his Guadalajara cartel, and orchestrated around a stable 
partnership with PRI officials at various levels of government, but with the success of US efforts 
to interdict the flow of Colombian cocaine through the Caribbean during that decade, the logics 
of the drug trade began to change. Colombian traffickers turned to Mexico as a more reliable 
transshipment corridor, and the profitability of the trade skyrocketed. These new opportunities 
came during a generational shift in Mexico’s trafficking community, one in which the old bosses 
endeavored to divide up the plazas through which drugs flowed. In a classic enactment of 
Mexican corporatism, after the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 1987 brought more 
scrutiny of Gallardo, he offered Tijuana to the Arellano Félix brothers, Ciudad Juárez to the 
Carrillo Fuentes family, and Sonora to Miguel Caro Quintero. The Matamoros corridor was left 
to Juan García Abrego, who formed the Gulf cartel, and Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael 
Zambada García were given control of the Pacific coast, eventually forming what became known 
as the Sinaloa Cartel. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s drug trafficking was a particularly attractive means to 
improve consumption for poor people in peripheral regions, strengthening economies often left 
behind by globalization. El Chapo Guzmán famously donated thousands of dollars and gifts to 
his opium growers after heavy rains devastated their crops, followed by a Christmas gift of 100 
all-terrain vehicles. Legend abounds of discipline he laid down against local thieves in regions he 
controlled. In Michoacán, the Familia Michoacana, which appeared brutal to outsiders, was 
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revered in parts of the state as a source of paternalism, clientelism, and support in times of need, 
and for its “fair” mediation of local conflicts. They demanded a heavy price for their willingness 
to act as a local form of order, but for at least some of the people in the territories they ruled, it 
seemed a better deal than the one offered by the federal state.  
Democratization in Mexico threatened these local arrangements, making the old alliances 
that secured the interests of the traffickers less reliable because of the threat that new political 
elites would displace the old ones (making it increasingly attractive for the traffickers to begin 
actively to fund political campaigns30), Yet democratization, even when pressed by the supposed 
left party (the PRD), never promised to up-end the logics of class and race in Mexico. Mexico’s 
three principle parties endeavored to manage the democratization process during the 1990s in 
ways that would to do little to disrupt traditional power arrangements. Unlike elsewhere in the 
region, Mexico’s transition to democracy did not lead to significant shift in the composition of 
the political class or the functionings of power, at the local, state, and national level. When some 
within the new system and representatives of victims’ groups undertook to produce new 
institutions, to combat rent-seeking or to account for past injustices, the influence of old actors 
from the authoritarian regime basically derailed these efforts.31 And even while they engaged in 
vicious campaign smears, at heart each party remained committed to roughly similar agendas.  
Indeed, the drug business seems to have undergone more changes than the political 
system during these years. Since the 1980s weapons had been flowing into Mexico from the US 
at an unprecedented rate, increasing the capacity of the newly forming cartels to exact violence 
on one another in their efforts to defend and expand their plazas. These conflicts worsened after 
the death of Amado Carillo Fuentes (head of the Juárez cartel) in 1997 destabilized the division 
of plazas among the traffickers, leading to increased violence among the cartels and the 
emergence of a series of new actors, most notably the Zetas, an exceptionally violent offshoot of 
the Gulf cartel.32 The violence was stoked by the fact that 2,000 weapons were entering illegally 
Mexico per day by the 2000s.33  
By the early 2000s Mexico was already experiencing a series of spillover effects from 
trafficking. Various forms of violence, some of it spectacular like the assassination of the Bishop 
of Guadalajara, some of it quotidian, like taxi-kidnappings, gave middle-class Mexicans 
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increasing reason to feel that something was spinning out of control in the country. Even as 
national statistics suggested that the murder rate was going down, by the late 1990s middle-class 
Mexicans increasingly spoke of a state that had lost all control of the country, and everyone 
either knew someone or had themselves been a victim of crime. Fear of insecurity was 
everywhere. Kidnappings were epidemic. In half of Mexico’s states, the chance of a murder 
leading to a conviction was less than 1%.  
Vicente Fox, who took office in a historic transition in 2000, responded to this crisis by 
militarizing policing, but it was his successor Felipe Calderón who opted for a full-scale military 
interdiction, beginning in Chihuahua in 2007. His soldiers stepped into a full-scale war between 
factions from Mexico’s two dominant cartels (the Sinaloa and Gulf) for control of the Juárez 
plaza, and immediately found themselves completely out-matched. They could not count on local 
police for support, and even elements in the army were taking payments from one side or the 
other. The nadir came in October 2010, when 16 teenagers attending a birthday party were 
murdered by gangsters in what appeared to be a case of mistaken identity. Calderón, who was 
out of the country at the time of the massacre, initially dismissed the victims as gangsters, only to 
eat his words as the details emerged. This massacre became the indelible moment of Calderón’s 
drug war. 
Mexico has been engulfed in violent drug war since 2007. Some 120,000 people have lost 
their lives, and wide swaths of the country have gained a reputation for spectacular forms of 
violence (the North, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Michoacán and Guerrero in particular). The murder 
rate has more than doubled. More than 25,000 people have disappeared,34 thousands of them 
victims of state agencies. Twice high government officials in charge of the drug war have died in 
suspicious aviation accidents. Entire police forces have been dismissed for their links to 
organized crime. Dozens of journalists have been targeted for assassination. Today nearly 75% 
of Mexicans believe they live in a region that is unsafe.35 And more chillingly, all of the efforts 
by the state to fight the narcos seem to have had little impact on the illicit drug trade in Mexico, 
which may in fact be more robust today than it was when Calderon went to war in 2007.  
Mexicans do not simply fear the narcos. In spite of repeated efforts to create new police 
forces and remove officers tainted with corruption, Mexico’s security agencies remain one of the 
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most significant threats to citizen security. According to a 2014 report, 18,000 police vetted for 
ties to crime in the previous year (out of 135,511 in all) failed to meet acceptable standards. In 
Veracruz and Baja California Sur, 60% of officers did not meet the basic standard.36 In Veracruz 
77% of the police who were tested failed. In all, at the municipal, state, and federal level, 42,214 
police failed to pass their vetting tests. As of November 2014, 17 states had still not dismissed 
the officers who failed. Three of the worst states in terms of failure rates in vetting (Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, and Jalisco) are also among the states with the lowest pay for police.37 
The Two Solitudes 
In the context of a largely failed effort both to reform the state and to fight the drug war, 
Mexicans were confronted with a series of potential options in 2012. The 40% of voters who 
chose Peña Nieto tacitly made the assumption that a return to PRI rule would bring a de-
escalation in the drug war, largely because they believed the PRI would quietly seek a return to 
the informal arrangements of the past. The PAN was so tainted by Calderón’s failures in the drug 
war and the sense that his regime had done little to contain corruption that the party’s candidate, 
Josefina Vázquez Mota, gained only 26% of the vote (Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the PRD 
candidate, won 32.5%). 
Peña Nieto was particularly unpopular with students, human rights activists, and liberals. 
News about his secret deals with the nation’s largest TV network (Televisa) circulated well in 
advance of the election,38 and the student movement Yo Soy 132 effectively consolidated around 
a general sense among young idealists that his candidacy represented a return to the caciquismo 
(boss politics) of an earlier generation. Their fears were not dispelled when immediately after his 
election he agreed with leaders of the PAN, PRD, and Green Party to the Pact for Mexico, which 
formally promised to end political gridlock in the congress by committing to the parties to work 
together on educational, energy, and other reforms. Many suspected it was simply a ploy to once 
again concentrate an enormous amount of power in the executive branch (as had been the case 
prior to the 1990s). Academics, human rights activists, and victims groups continued to press for 
an end to impunity, more transparency, efforts to combat corruption, and citizen security,39 but 
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under the Pact they lost the leverage that they had been able to develop in the legislative branch 
over the previous two decades. 
It is not hard to understand why urban, middle-class, educated Mexicans might support 
the creation of strong democratic and civil-society institutions. Not only does this seem like a 
sensible response to widespread institutional failure, it aligns them with a kind of first worldism 
that has been critical to Mexico’s democratic transitions since the 1980s, and links them to 
increasingly globalized cultural and intellectual communities in the US and elsewhere. Many of 
the most prominent voices in these fields, including Denise Dresser, Sergio Aguayo, Claudio 
Lomnitz, Enrique Krause, John Ackerman, and Alejandro Hope, either live or were educated 
abroad. Furthermore, these desires do resonate beyond a small intellectual elite. The 2004 March 
against Delinquency, which brought around 700,000 protestors into the streets of Mexico City in 
the largest march ever in the city, was organized around a call to reform the judicial system, end 
corruption, and fight impunity.  
Hecklers standing on the sidelines that day attacked the white-clad marchers as middle-
class stooges, claiming that they were ignoring the real social crises unfolding in the country. 
The hecklers may have been leftist opportunists attempting to hijack a human security issue for a 
different ideological battle, but their attacks resonated for many Mexicans. Among those more 
likely to stand with the hecklers were the students at the Ayotzinapa Normal School, who had 
long immersed themselves in the rhetoric and images of the revolutionary left. And to be sure, 
this is where sites like Ayotzinapa offer a real source of anxiety for many Mexicans. Unlike 
urban leftists and members of the radical unions (particularly the teachers unions) who can be 
dismissed as anachronisms or cynics, the students from Ayotzinpa were desperately poor, 
indigenous, and clearly the losers of the global age. This made them dangerous. 
In part this is why we need to consider the response by defenders of the regime to the 
approach of the caravans on November 20 as something more than a cynical effort to dismiss the 
protests. Conservative commentators, including Ricardo Alemán, repeatedly exhorted the 
government to crack down on the radicals they claimed were leading the demonstrations. Beatriz 
  





Image: Mural on the side of one of the buildings at the Ayotzinapa Normal School. 
 
 
Pagés Rebollar, the PRI’s Secretary of Culture, complained on the PRI website that the protests 
were orchestrated acts of vandalism, and signs that the disappearance and presumed deaths of the 
students were simply “a strategic trap aimed at Mexico”. She used the term “extermination” in 
her posting, evoking a series of disturbing images, but also complained that “all these activists 
and propagandists have the same modus operandi.” Veteran Priista and ad executive Carlos 
Alazraki used similar language, dismissing the Ayotzinapa disappearances in La Razón as a 
conflict between guerrillas (the students) and narcos, each of whom wanted to rule the region. He 
called the entire lot unrepresentative of “normal Mexicans.”  
Others took to Facebook, twitter, and YouTube, calling the disappeared students a variety 
of names. “Pinches nacos, se lo merecen”; “Estuvo feo lo que les hicieron, pero los putos no 
dejaron pasar una ambulancia”; “Que putos, ya que estudien pinches huevones”; “Tanto pedo x 
unos pinches indios prietos mugrosos! Son 100% reemplazables con otros 30 millones de lacras 
iguales!!”; “Yo me alegro que los hayan desaparecido y ojala y ya estén muertos, me cagan las 
putas marchas de gente sin oficio ni beneficio ojala y maten a mas…”; “Ayotzinapa no somos 
todos, no generalicen. No podemos ser iguales a esos pinches indios”.40 
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By no means do these expressions speak for all Mexicans, yet these are not merely 
isolated utterances. They speak to the layers of privilege that characterize middle-class and elite 
life in Mexico, the hierarchies that ensure both that rural dark-skinned Mexicans are the poorest 
in a deeply unequal society. And it is this arrangement that movements that focusing on citizen 
security, transparent government, and human rights are most challenged to address. It is not at all 
clear that their projects can coincide with either the traditional project of elite control or the types 
of popular politics that emerge out of places like Ayotzinapa. Most of those marching in Mexico 
City seem to want a better state, while Los Queremos Vivos brings the very desirability of that 
state into question.  
I am reminded here of the reaction to the following photo, tweeted in late February, 2015: 
 
 
The image captures a masked protestor standing next to the base of the Angel de la 
Independencia, an iconic Mexico City monument. The graffiti in the photo declares, “Justice will 
arrive when the blood of the bourgeoisie begins to flow.” Like earlier photos of banners 
depicting Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, unfurled by protestors in the Zócalo41, this photo 
raised some alarm even among tweeters who made a habit of lambasting the government. 
Alejandro Hope, a well-respected security expert with a degree from Princeton, tweeted “Si se 
busca construir una coalición amplia en favor de la justicia, tal vez este no sea el mensaje más 
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apropiado.” Hector de Mauleón, the editor of the high-culture magazine Nexos, tweeted: 
“Prodigioso. Barbarie y bestialidad en la misma capucha!” 
Poor, rural, dark-skinned Mexicans understand that this may not be the most 
“appropriate” way to construct a coalition for justice. And yet for them, it is not clear that any 
kind of coalition will address the bare life that they live. None ever has. 
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